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𝝀 Mereological Nihilism as a description of reality

Mereological nihilism is the philosophical position that there are no items that have parts. If there are no items with parts then the only items that exist are partless fundamental particles. In this article, we will show that it is the correct description of reality through strong similarities with empirical results in quantum physics. In particular, we will see how it vindicates a few other theories of philosophical atomism, by providing a direct interpretation of quantum mechanics that avoids the problems of other interpretations.

1. Introduction
2. Basic issues in conceptual quantum physics
3. The problem of emergence

Introduction

Mereological nihilism is the theory that the only things that exist are the atomic (partless) quantum particles. In other words, only partless fundamental particles exist (electrons, quarks, etc.), they do not compose any composite objects, and thus empirical reality does not exist. Traditionally, and more specifically, mereological nihilism is the philosophical position that objects that have parts do not exist. If an item C is believed to exist due to the belief that it is composed of two parts, a and b, C does not exist; it is a figment of the conceptual imagination, a mental fabrication.
Hereafter, I will call quantum objects that do not have parts « quantum atoms » for reasons I will clarify. The data of experimental quantum physics reveals that the partless quantum abstract atoms are point-sized (pointless), unstructured non-material, surfaceless, non-interacting, irreducible, and perhaps indistinguishable quantum objects (true philosophical atoms) that have an incredibly short-lived and/or instantaneous existence.

Quantum physics is an empirical science, but oddly, many quantum physicists have combined it with a metaphysical philosophy that involves all sorts of unobservable, non-empirical, non-scientific, non-experimental, and nonsensical items (e.g. collapsing probability waves, existent past times, smeared point-particles, wave-particle duality, where waves are unobservable, etc). These metaphysical items can be shown to be impossible entities (i.e., non-existent ones) that have nothing to do with the strictly empirical findings of quantum physics.

Basic issues in conceptual quantum physics

The rudimentary conceptual features of experimental quantum physics are not widely developed, nor widely agreed upon, by the quantum physicists. They often call partless quantum objects unstructured objects. An object is unstructured if it does not have parts or size, just as an electron or neutrino is apparently unstructured.

"Why do we [physicists] think that electrons and quarks are the true « Greek atoms » ? Investigators have tried by many means to determine whether electrons, quarks and gluons show any evidence of structure, and they have not found any. These experiments probed perhaps 10,000 times further than it took to see structure in the past, but electrons and quarks continue to behave as point-like subjects."

Gordon Kane

Indistinguishability between quantum means that there are often no differences that can be pointed out between particles that are at different places. In other words, quantum philosophical atoms are indistinguishable particles that are not coinciding : quantum atoms share all the same perceived properties, and thus from what is observed about them through quantum instrumentation, those observations do not provide data that allows quantum researchers to clearly distinguish quantum abstract atoms from one another. Along the same lines, the evidence for mereological nihilism also leads to the thesis that quantum atoms are indistinguishable : it is after all the theory that reality does not involve any parts and wholes, and if it does not, then only one thing exists.
For that reason, two principle points can be made about mereological nihilism :

  1. The particles that exist can only be philosophical atoms (for example, electrons exist, and protons do no not)
  2. The particles that exist must be indistinguishable.

Empirically based quantum physics does not necessarily lead to the position that all quantum atoms are indistinguishable, but it comes quite close to such a position for a number of reasons. Quantum non-separability (also called quantum non-locality) involves the discovery that analysis and manipulation of a particle here affects another one somewhere else instantly, since the two particles are in some sense entangled. Quantum non-separability has already been confirmed and it shows that how particles that seem distinct since they appear to be at different locations, in fact are not distinct. It gives more reason to conjecture that physics will continue to move from the idea that particles are separate and distinct, to the idea where particles are found to be indistinguishable and non-separate. Non-local and entangled quantum atoms are not individualistic from one to the next. In particular, the discovery that quantum atoms are non-local indicates that they exhibit inseparability and it may be the case that all particles exhibit quantum inseparability.

Quantum atoms do not stand in any relations to one another, and they are unconnected and unattached to one another. Contrary to popular belief, forces and quantum fields are not continuous connections between quantum objects. There are many reasons why this erroneous idea has arisen. For example, meta-physicians might suggest that if quantum particles are entangled and exhibit quantum inseparability, it may seem to follow that they are connected or interrelated, in some sense, and it may seem that reference to these indistinguishable quantum atoms also involves the reference to metaphysical connections or relations– namely the relations indistinguishable and not collated that stand between the quantum particles.
Another way to put the issue is as follows: if a particle $A$ that is here, and particle $B$ that is there, where $A$ and $B$ are one light year apart, it might seem that they exist in a relationship to one another, which could be called, at a distance from one light year apart.

Perhaps humans, in experiencing physical objects, have certain experiences of the objects, such as seeing $p_1$ at $x$, and seeing $p_2$ at $y$, and in comparing them mentally, invent concepts, such as that there are real, mind-independent relations in nature between entities, where we imagine a real connection between them, and we do not recognize that we might only behold just the non-collocated spatial objects.
In other words, it is arguable that we what is experienced are two objects $p_1$ at $x$ and $p_2$ at $y$, but only in the mind is there any sort of connection between them. For these reasons, the sentence « the elephant is taller than the lion », need not be false, for it corresponds to three specific entities : the statement describes three experiences

  1. the experience of a lion
  2. the experience of an elephant
  3. the experience of comparing the (I) and (II), where, unlike the experiences of (I) and (II), the item denoted by « taller than » is a concept that does not represent anything outside of that experience.

Atomism traditionally has been very often oriented toward nihilism , as was the case in ancient Greece, and often involved by the rejection of the idea that there are metaphysical connections or relations between philosophical atoms. Atomism is a philosophy that goes back to the ancient philosophers, and some accounts of it appear to be surprisingly consistent with contemporary experimental quantum physics, and specifically with the mereological interpretation of it.

The problem of emergence

In order to understand the problem, it is first necessary to understand exactly what is meant by the term 'emergent property'. To begin with a rough gloss, we can say that an emergent property is a property of an object or system that cannot be explained or accounted for solely in terms of the properties of that object's or system's constituent parts. It is in this sense that emergent properties are often said to be 'novel', in that they are take they are taken to be something entirely distinct from the properties of their bearer's basal constituents. To give a commonly used example, it is often suggested that the phenomenal properties of conscious experience are emergent. The actual phenomenal experience of elation, for example, is taken to be entirely distinct from and irreducible to, the electro-chemical properties of the brain which underpin it. These properties emerge at a certain level and cannot be reduced to properties instantiated by objects at a lower level. By recognizing emergence, one recognizes that in physical systems, the whole is often more than the of its parts.